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OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Given the structure of plaintiff's Statement of Facts in
his responding Brief, it is difficult to tell if the plaintiff is
challenging the Lower Court's Findings of Fact or providing support
in the record for the Lower Court's Findings of Fact. It is almost
impossible to tell how much of each paragraph is the Lower Court's
finding and how much is "fact" plaintiff wished the Lower Court had
found.

Plaintiff paraphrases "facts" allegedly in the record in

such a way as to be argument.

Many of the citations are wrong;

that is, the testimony on the cited pages do not provide the basis
for the articulated
objection

"fact."

it has within

Gem will identify each specific

the context

of

each

of plaintiff's

"Findings."
Plaintiff's Finding No. 2:

No testimony in the cited

pages of the transcript or Addendum 3 support plaintiff's statement
that his position teaching violin at Prier's Violin Making School
was a "modest position for him", or that such a position was all
plaintiff

could

handle

because

of

his

1983

auto

accident.

Furthermore, the transcript at pages 51 and 55 show testimony
unrelated to plaintiff's violin teaching, his monthly salary or his
hours of employment.
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Plaintiff's Finding No. 3:

The transcript citation of

page 41 is incorrect; it does not say what plaintiff claims it
says. Also, there is no evidence at page 51 of the transcript, or
anywhere else in the transcript, that plaintiff told a "Gem State
agent" his health needs. The person with whom plaintiff discussed
his health needs was an independent insurance broker, not an agent
of the defendant. Transcript at 44-50. Also, there is no evidence
in the record as to what the independent agent said to the
plaintiff;

the

plaintiff

attempted

to

get

in

such

hearsay

testimony, but defendants Objection on that ground was sustained.
Transcript at 44.
Plaintiff claims that the University of Utah Pain Clinic
contacted the defendant and obtained pre-authorization to admit the
plaintiff.

The cited portions of the transcript reflect testimony

of one of plaintiff's physicians, Dr. Heil. In fact, Dr. Heil had
no

personal

knowledge

of

The

Pain

Clinic

obtaining

pre-

authorization from the defendant of plaintiff's treatment at The
Pain Clinic.

Transcript at 75-76.

Plaintiff's Finding No. 11; Defendant's general counsel
never stated that defendant should have walked over to plaintiff's
place

of

records.

employment

and

personally

inspected

the

employment

The citation to the transcript at pages 456 and 477 is
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incorrect.

Furthermore, although defendant had the authority in

its master policy to inspect the records of plaintiff's employer
at any time during normal business hours, plaintiff testified at
trial that his employer advised him not to cooperate with the
defendant.

Transcript at 197.
Plaintiff's Finding No. 13;

Plaintiff mischaracterizes

Carolyn Ivie's trial testimony and then miscites to the record at
the pages 75-77 of the transcript (which is actually defendant's
counsel's

cross-examination

of

Dr. Heil)

and

Addendum

4 of

plaintiff's Brief (which is a letter from Shirley Sunderland).
Plaintiff then spends almost two pages discussing the
number of hours he claims defendant required him to work in order
that he be eligible for health insurance.

In fact, defendant's

general counsel testified that the number of hours plaintiff worked
was never at issue; what was at issue was whether plaintiff was
employed.

Transcript at 456.

Finding 13.

The Lower Court agreed with this.

The Lower Court found that defendant's investigation

of plaintiff's employment did not seek evidence of how many hours
plaintiff worked per month. All of plaintiff's allegations in his
Statement of Facts and argument to the contrary are without support
in

the

record

or

in

the

Lower

Court's

Findings

of

Fact.

Plaintiff's claim of "Fact" that plaintiff's eligibility had been
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"misjudged" by defendant based on a one thousand hour rule is
without basis in the record.
Plaintiff's Finding No. 15:
(a)

First paragraph —

This is all argument.

The pages

cited by plaintiff in the transcript at 92 and 94-96 deal only with
plaintiff's testimony as to his contacts with the defendant, not
any regression in his medical condition.
(b)

Second paragraph —

Again, plaintiff raises the red

herring of a one thousand hour rule, which is not at issue in this
litigation.

Plaintiff did not cross-appeal seeking a new Finding

of Fact on this "fact;" therefore, it cannot be argued at this
time.
(c)

Third paragraph —

Whether plaintiff's employer was

an unsophisticated businessman is not supported in the record, nor
it is relevant to this litigation.
(d)
defendant

Fourth

paragraph

—

never told plaintiff's

Plaintiff

claims

that

employer why his two

reflecting plaintiff's hours of work were unacceptable.

the

letters
However,

the Lower Court found (at Findings 7 and 10) that on two occasions
defendant wrote letters to plaintiff's employer requesting specific
payroll

information,

plaintiff's

employer

not

merely

stating,

self-serving

without
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any

letters

independent

from
record

verification, that plaintiff was employed.
(e)

Fifth paragraph — Again, plaintiff mischaracterizes

defendant's general counsel's testimony.

The testimony in the

cited transcript pages 262, 296 and 456 have nothing to do with
what

plaintiff

claims

they

do.

Defendant's

general

counsel

testified that, in light of all the litigation (and, implicitly,
even though defendant was not in any way obligated to do so) , maybe
the defendant should have talked to plaintiff's employer personally
and explained in large print what defendant wanted.
(f)

Seventh

paragraph

—

Plaintiff

blatantly

mischaracterizes Carolyn Ivie's testimony. Ms. Ivie testified that
defendant did not complete their investigation in forty-five days
because of plaintiff's delays.
540 is incorrect.

The citation of the transcript at

Furthermore, she testified that plaintiff was

notified within twenty (20) days of his claim of defendant's delay
in

processing

while

medical

records

were

being

obtained.

Transcript at 323.
Plaintiff's Finding No. 17; Plaintiff claims that Gerald
Ottley of the Mormon Tabernacle Choir testified that had "this
incident" (what incident? his December 1983 accident? the alleged
wrongdoing of defendant?) not occurred, plaintiff would have been
very

well

established

nationwide
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as

a

conductor

making

a

substantial living.

In fact, contrary to plaintiff's claim, Mr.

Ottley testified that without Plaintiff's automobile accident in
1983, "and also admitting there is a great deal of serendipity
involved in building a career, I think with the right breaks he
would have been very well established nationwide."

Transcript at

223.

ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Plaintiff has failed to rebut defendant's arguments with
regard to the inadequacies of the Lower Court's Findings of Fact
and the error of the Lower Court's Conclusions of Law with regard
to the alleged breach by defendant of its insurance contract with
plaintiff and its implied contractual covenant of good faith and
fair dealing with plaintiff.

Plaintiff has further failed to

substantively rebut defendant's argument that the Lower Court's
award of costs to Plaintiff was error in amount; that the Lower
Court's award of consequential damages was based upon speculative
evidence, if any evidence at all; that the Lower Court's denial of
newly-found evidence at trial was error; and that the denial of
defendant's Counterclaim for Attorney's Fees was error.

Because

plaintiff has failed to rebut defendant's arguments, either legally
or with citations to the record, this Court should reverse the
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Lower Court's Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and for judgment
on behalf of defendant.

ARGUMENT
I.

WHETHER DEFENDANT PRE-AUTHORIZED PLAINTIFFS IN-PATIENT STAY
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH PAIN CLINIC IS NOT AT ISSUE IN THIS
LITIGATION.
Plaintiff

argues

that

defendant

pre-authorized

Plaintiff's Pain Clinic bills prior to his entering the Pain
Clinic, and that it later refused to pay those claims.
that was not an issue before the Lower Court.

In fact,

The only issue

addressed by defendant in their investigation from May 2, 1986 to
September 29, 1986, when plaintiff's insurance policy was cancelled
by his employer, was whether plaintiff was employed by Peter Paul
Prier.

Finding 13.
Plaintiff apparently claims that because defendant sent

plaintiff an Explanation of Benefits form (which defendant's thenclaims manager testified was sent in error) noting that Pain Clinic
claims would
authorized,

be paid
defendant

at
is

fifty
bound,

(50%) percent

and were pre-

notwithstanding

any

other

developments of any kind, to pay plaintiff's subsequent Pain Clinic
medical bills.

In fact, the issue of whether plaintiff was

employed at all did not come up until after the defendant had sent
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plaintiff the Explanation of Benefits form.
The Lower Court found that on March 31, 1986, defendant
received plaintiff's medical bills from the Pain Clinic.
4.

Finding

The Lower Court then found that defendant sent plaintiff the

Explanation of Benefits form noting pre-authorization on or about
April 4, 1986.

Finding 5.

As set forth in defendant's Statement

of Facts in its initial brief, defendant subsequently obtained
medical records from the Pain Clinic, which records expressly
stated that plaintiff told different Pain Clinic personnel that he
was either working only part time or not at all.

Tratnscript at

393, 422; Trial Exh. 17, 18 (See Addenda 1 and 2 to defendant's
initial brief).

As discussed at length in defendant's initial

brief, defendant was entitled to withhold any insurance benefits
until the question of plaintiff's employment status was resolved
(Section 11(B) of defendant's initial brief).
Furthermore,

the

"pre-authorization"

Explanation

of

Benefits form was sent to the plaintiff after April 4, 1986, two
months after plaintiff entered the Pain Clinic for treatment.
Finding 3.

The Lower Court noted at the trial that the "pre-

authorization" Explanation of Benefits form could not be the basis
for any contractual obligation on the part of the defendant to pay
plaintiff's Pain Clinic bills, as the plaintiff could not have

- 8 -

relied upon it prior to entering the Pain Clinic.

Transcript at

538.
Plaintiff claims that the independent insurance agent who
sold defendant's health insurance policy to plaintiff was an agent
(for purposes

of

imputation

of knowledge)

of the defendant.

Contrary to plaintiff's allegations, no evidence was admitted
before the Lower Court with regard to any alleged assurances of
coverage given by this independent agent to plaintiff.

In fact,

defendant vigorously argued to the Lower Court that Mark Anderson
was an independent insurance agent under Utah statutory provisions
and case law, rather than an agent of defendant. Transcript at 4451; 481-491.

The Lower Court never made a ruling on the agency

question, but refused to allow hearsay testimony from the plaintiff
with regard to any comments Mark Anderson may have made to the
plaintiff.
The pre-authorization non-issue was not a basis for any
Finding or Conclusion of breach by the Lower Court, and plaintiff
did not raise it in a cross-appeal.
ignored by this Court.
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Accordingly, it should be

II.

PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO REBUT THE LEGAL AND RECORD CITATIONS
OF DEFENDANT THAT DEFENDANT ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND DEALT
FAIRLY WITH THE PLAINTIFF.
In support of his argument that defendant did not act in

good faith or deal fairly with him, plaintiff merely cites the Utah
cases cited by the defendant in support of defendant's argument,
without explaining how the facts in this case, within the standard
set by Beck v, Farmerfs Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah
1985) and Callioux v, Progressive Insurance Company, 745 P.2d 838
(Utah App. 1987), support plaintiff's claim of breach of contract.
There

is

no

discussion

by

plaintiff

rebutting

defendant's

utilization of those cases in support of its argument of a good
faith and reasonable investigation.
Plaintiff

cites

Fletcher

v.

Western

National

Life

Insurance Co. . 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) , for the proposition of bad
faith interpretation of medical reports. Plaintiff doesn't say how
or if defendant interpreted plaintiff's medical records in bad
faith.

In fact, plaintiff's medical records expressly raise

questions as to plaintiff's employment status. This is undisputed
in the record.

See, Trial Exh. 17, 18

defendants initial brief).

(Addenda 1 and 2 in

The Lower Court failed to make any

finding in that regard, which was error in light of those medical
records being the very reason defendant initiated its investigation
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of plaintiff's employment status.
Also, where (as argued in defendant's initial brief)
defendant was entitled to see evidence of plaintiff's employment
status, and withhold insurance benefits until the question as to
plaintiff's employment status was satisfactorily resolved, and
plaintiff and his employer consistently refused to provide that
information to the defendant, defendant did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously in denying plaintiff's claims until such records were
provided. Bali v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, 873 F.2d
1043, 1048 (7th Cir. 1989).*
Plaintiff claims that some employees of the defendant
wanted to know how many hours plaintiff was working per year;
others wanted to know merely whether he was employed.

This may be

plaintiff's argument, but the Lower Court found that the only issue

*The Seventh Circuit noted that the policy at issue in the
Bali case entitled the policy administrator to require a disability
claimant to submit to a medical examination at any time in order
to determine whether the claimant was disabled, similar to (in this
case) defendant's master policy entitling defendant to examine the
records of plaintiff's employer at any time. The Seventh Circuit
did not put the burden on the policy administrator in the Bali case
to actually require the claimant to submit to a medical
examination; rather, the Seventh Circuit found that the claimant
was required to provide objective evidence of his disability to the
policy administrator prior to requiring the policy administrator
to pay benefits. Similarly, this Court should place the burden on
plaintiff to provide his employment records when asked, in order
to obtain benefits.
- 11 -

of concern to the defendant was whether plaintiff was employed, not
how many hours he was working.
Plaintiff

claims

Finding 13.

that

defendant

took

too

long

to

investigate and deny Plaintiff's medical claims, and that such
alleged delay did not conform to the letter or spirit of the Utah
State Insurance Department regulations.
findings

that

defendant

breached

such

The Lower Court made no
regulations,

nor

did

plaintiff raise such claims in his pre-trial pleadings. Plaintiff
points to no evidence in the record, nor any supportincj case law,
to

flesh out the conclusory

and

self-serving

statement that

defendant took too long to investigate and deny plaintiff's claims.
III. PLAINTIFFS DAMAGES.
Plaintiff attempts to rebut defendant's claim that the
$5,000.00

awarded

by

the

Lower

Court

to

the

plaintiff

for

consequential damages is unsupported in the record and is too
speculative.

First, plaintiff

claims that

the

$5,000.00 is

probably too low a figure, and then claims that defendant should
have foreseen the emotional distress that a "professional musical
conductor and violinist" would suffer in not having his insurance
claims paid

(plaintiffs brief at 15-16).

Plaintiff cites no

evidence in the record, nor any supporting case law, for the
implicit proposition that musicians are more emotionally fragile
- 12 -

than anyone else, nor does he make any attempt to support the
$5,000.00 figure with evidence in the record.
Plaintiff argues that the $5,000.00 "are clearly a result
of pain and suffering, inconvenience and loss of work opportunity
that were extensively testified to in trial . . . "

(plaintiffs

brief at 17). Plaintiff does not cite to the transcript for any
of the "extensive testimony" in support of this flagrantly selfserving

statement.

Any

increased

pain

and

suffering

and

detrimental changes in plaintiff's health based upon defendant's
alleged breach of contract or implied contractual covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is covered by the Lower Court's award of
$3,500.00 in medical expenses incurred after plaintiff's coverage
was terminated by his employer.
There
speculation
damages.

to

is

no

support

evidence
the

Finding 17(b).
in

the

$5,000.00

record

award

of

sheer

consequential

Defendant argued in its initial brief at pages 39-40

about plaintiff's so called "lost opportunities".
evidence

beyond

in

the

record

of

actual

lost

There must be

opportunities,

their

causation, and the amount lost to sustain the $5,000.00 award.
There is none. There is no evidence in the record that any alleged
wrongful failure on the part of defendant to pay plaintiff's
medical bills was causally connected to any lost opportunity.
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Plaintiff's testimony about tentative discussions with out-of-state
orchestras is not adequate to establish the certainty with which
"lost opportunity" damages must be shown. Canyon Country Store v.
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 418-419 (Utah 1989).

IV.

PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO REBUT DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT THAT THE
LOWER COURT'S REFUSAL TO ADMIT DEFENDANTS NOTIFICATION
LETTERS AND REQUEST FOR MEDICAL RECORDS AT TRIAL WAS ERROR.
Plaintiff has failed to provide any case law challenging

that set forth in defendant's initial brief at pages 21-24 in
support of the proposition that the Lower Court should have
admitted the evidence defendant provided at time of trial not
earlier supplied to the plaintiff. Defendant acknowledges that the
general rule regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence is
that the trial court's decision will not be overturned in the
absence of an abuse of discretion.

Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co.,

781 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah App. 1989).

However, at trial plaintiff

did not show any exception to the general rule that such evidence
should be admitted in the absence of: prejudice to the plaintiff,
knowing

concealment

of the evidence by defendant,

change in

defendant's theories based upon the new evidence, or that the new
evidence raised new issues.
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In his responding brief plaintiff still hasn't rebutted
the case law cited by defendant, nor pointed to any evidence in the
record to fit within one of the exceptions to the general rule of
admissibility.

Accordingly, the Lower Court's denial of the

admissibility of the evidence was error.

V.

PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES BASED UPON AN
APPEAL THAT IS EITHER FRIVOLOUS OR FOR DELAY PURPOSES.
While plaintiff claims that he is entitled to attorney's

fees for defending against defendant's frivolous appeal, he does
not cite any evidence in the record, or provide any supporting case
law, indicating that defendant's

issues raised on appeal are

frivolous, or that defendant brought the appeal solely for delay.
While he claims that defendant's Statement of Facts, in its initial
brief "mischaracterized and misstated the evidence presented by
both parties at the trial," he does not at any time itemize his
concerns with defendant's Statement of Factsjas defendant has at
the beginning of this Reply Brief with regard to plaintiff's
Statement of Facts.

Other than making conclusory statements that

the frivolous appeals entitle the defending party to attorney's
fees,

plaintiff

states

nothing

that

entitlement to such attorney's fees.
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supports

his

claim

of

VI.

CONCLUSION
In his responding brief, plaintiff has provided no

substantive rebuttal to defendant's factual and legal arguments
supporting its appeal of the Lower Court's Judgment in favor of
plaintiff.

He has not rebutted defendant's claims about the

inadequacy of the Lower Court's Findings of Fact, or the wrongful
Findings made by the Lower Court in light of the overwhelming
evidence in the record.

Furthermore, plaintiff has provided no

case law, in Utah or other jurisdictions, that rebuts the legal
standard for determining a breach of insurance contract or breach
of implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing
articulated by defendant.

Defendant has marshalled what facts are

in the record to support the Lower Court's Findings, but the Lower
Court's

own underlying

Findings do not

support

its ultimate

Findings of breach and damages.
Based upon the specific arguments set forth in its
initial and reply briefs, defendant respectfully requests this
Court to reverse the Lower Court's Conclusions that defendant
breached its insurance contract with plaintiff and breached its
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing with
plaintiff, vacate the award of damages to the plaintiff, rule that
defendant's counterclaim for attorney's fees and costs incurred in
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defending against plaintiff's lawsuit has merit and should be
granted, grant defendant its attorney's fees and costs incurred in
bringing this appeal, and deny plaintiff's claims for attorney's
fees incurred in defending against defendant's appeal.
DATED this 5th day of January, 1990.

TIBBALS, HOWELL, WILKINS & ORITT

Jeffrey R. Oritt L
Attorneys for Defendant
Gem State Mutual of Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of January, 1990,
I caused four true and correct copies of Defendant's Reply Brief
to be hand-delivered to the following:
John Preston Creer, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
36 South State Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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